

~~SECRET~~

Intel 38 (Cross) Production 57

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000500100004-9

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

ICS 75-1242

24 NOV 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT : Review of Intelligence Community
Time-Critical Response Capabilities

1. The DCI has tasked the Intelligence Community Staff to undertake a review of current and projected time-critical response mechanisms and capabilities within the Intelligence Community. The objective of this review is to improve the visibility of these capabilities to current and prospective users and ultimately to seek improvements as required.

2. As a first step in this effort, the IC Staff will hold a preliminary meeting to discuss the outline and planned approach to this review. The meeting is scheduled for 1000 hours on 4 December 1975. It will be held in Room 6 E 0708, CIA Headquarters.

3. Please contact either [redacted] of my Staff regarding your attendance at this meeting.

25X1

25X1

Samuel V. Wilson
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

Distribution:

OASD(I) (Mr. Goulder)
DIA (Gen Faurer & [redacted])
NSA [redacted]
SAFS [redacted]
State/INR (Mr. McAfee)
Chairman, SIGINT Committee
Chairman, COMIREX
D/NPIC
CIA/DDS&T & DDI

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000500100004-9

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Intel 3g

ICS 75-1243

Prod. 5g

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000500100004-9

21 NOV 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

SUBJECT : Community Time-Critical Response
Capabilities

1. Attached is a memorandum setting up a meeting to discuss the approach we will take in developing a detailed briefing on the Community Time-Critical Response Capabilities.

2. In your 4 November 1975 letter to Dr. Hall, you indicated concern that policy makers and intelligence users do not understand the Community's current and projected arrangements for meeting the time-critical needs. As a result of these concerns, the Intelligence Community has been asked to develop ways to increase the visibility of these arrangements.

3. The imagery briefings presented to USIB recently represent a first step. The next action is the scheduled meeting to develop a more comprehensive briefing that will include all data sources. I have designated [] of my Staff to take the primary role in organizing this briefing.

25X1

[]
Brigadier General, USAF
Acting Chief, Collection and
Processing Assessment Division

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000500100004-9

SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000500100004-9

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000500100004-9

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000500100004-9

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Copy 5 of 17

25X1

4 NOV 1975

The Honorable Albert C. Hall
Assistant Secretary for Intelligence
Department of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Al:

Your letter of 6 October suggests improving satellite responsiveness during crisis situations. Your interest in examining ways to improve Community performance in this area is one we share and one reflected in our current actions and planning.

A critical feature of the kinds of crisis situations which we are most likely to face in the near and midterm, it seems to me, is the necessity that intelligence cover all facets of the crisis, military, political and even economic. The National Security Council system establishes the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) as the vehicle for coordinated policy making. I believe it essential therefore that the tasking of our intelligence structure stem from that level rather than from being delegated down to any single agency which would be apt to stress its own requirements over those of outsiders. Thus, I would hope we would continue the studies that have been in progress on how to tie our new satellite capabilities, and even our existing intelligence machinery, closer to the WSAG level. I think this can be done through WSAG working groups, a vigorous National Intelligence Officer, and the varieties of systems established to insure that our Intelligence Community works as a whole rather than as parts. Once the priorities in tasking are established at this level, of course, the mechanical work of operating the satellites can indeed be delegated down and subordinate tasking assumed within categories or allocations decided above.

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000500100004-9

TOP SECRET

5X1

25X1

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000500100004-9

25X1

25X1

Future arrangements for controlling collection, and, equally as important, processing and dissemination, will have to provide for speedy weighing of priorities from various governmental entities. In a period of actual or imminent crisis, there are bound to be several different sets of intelligence consumers--at national and theater levels--and each consumer will legitimately consider his needs to carry the top priority and to be the most time-urgent. Anything that the governmental entities can do to define and categorize priorities will be welcome. DoD's focusing of its requirements within the NMCC is a very positive step in this direction.

Final actions on the tasking of collection systems are, as you know, subject to various constraints; chief of which are the limitations of the capacities of the system and the need to respond to policy direction while making trade-offs between intelligence and operational priorities. In the case of [] this will be done by locating Community representatives, who will act for the Community, [] In the case of SIGINT satellites, the Community operates under procedures and criteria for the development and implementation of mission guidance for time-critical requirements which were developed by the SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee of the SIGINT Committee. Under these procedures there has been rapid redirection of collection and processing resources to meet critical needs. We will keep these procedures under review to insure that performance can meet expectations.

I am concerned that policy makers and intelligence users do not well understand the Community's current and projected arrangements for meeting the time-critical needs of all concerned. To accomplish this, I have asked the Intelligence Community Staff to develop ways to increase the visibility of those arrangements. As we widen understanding, we will identify weaknesses and seek improvement where improvement is required.

Sincerely,

/s/ Bill

W. E. Colby

TOP SECRET

25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET
KENNEN

BYE 111645-75

25X1

DCI/IC/HEKnoche, [] 1s (10/20/75)
Distribution:

- Copy #1 - Addressee, ASD(I)
- Copy #2 - DCI
- Copy #3 - DDCI
- Copy #4 - ER
- Copy #5 - IC Registry
- Copy #6 - D/DCI/IC
- Copy #7 - AD/DCI/IC
- Copy #8 - A/C/CPAD- *POPP-AN*
- Copy #9 - C/COMIREX
- Copy #10 - A/C/MPRRD
- Copy #11 - C/PRD
- Copy #12 - PD/DCI/IC
- Copy #13 - D/NIO
- Copy #14 - AD/DDI
- Copy #15 - C/CIA/Oper.Center
- Copy #16 - USIB/IRAC Secretariat
- Copy #17 - C/SORS

Retyped:

DCI/WEColby/lm (11/4/75)

25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000500100004-9

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000500100004-9

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000500100004-9

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	D/DCI/IC (Slen)	10-18	
2	DCI	11/4	mc/bip
3			
4			
5			
6			

<input type="checkbox"/>	ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/>	DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/>	PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	DISPATCH	<input type="checkbox"/>	RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	FILE	<input type="checkbox"/>	RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/>	INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/>	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

This is a proposed response (basically with a tart tone) to Al Hall's recent letter suggesting that NMCC, after it determines a crisis exists or is imminent, be given ultimate authority to task satellites during crises.

Many in CIA and ICS (as well as in DoD) see the Hall letter as a watershed test of your responsibilities and are watching closely to see how the DCI responds. The virtually solid recommendation is that the response be tough.

Hank K.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
AD/DCI/IC	10/18/75

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000500100004-9

UNCLASSIFIED SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

STAT